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THE EVOLUTION OF OBSCENITY
CONTROL STATUTES
JOHN HARRINGTON
One of the more illusive legal concepts has been the
evolution of an adequate and yet constitutional definition of
obscenity, particularly as that term is used in statutes designed
to prohibit expressions of such a nature in literature, motion
pictures, and other creative art forms. Although an occasional
court will proceed with a peremptory observation that "the
term 'obscene' has achieved a sufficiently precise meaning to
describe a class of motion pictures which the state may
validly suppress," 1 most courts have come to realize that
" 'obscene' is not a technical term of the law and is not sus-
ceptible of exact definition, since such intangible moral con-
cepts as it purports to connote vary in meaning from one
period to another," 2and, it may be added, from place to place. 3
The "first serious attempt to define obscenity"'4 considered
the effect such material would have on "those whose minds
are open to such immoral influence, and into whose hands a
publication of this sort may fall."5 It has been observed
of the factual context of this case, however, that more of an
element of religious controversy existed in it than alleged
obscenity of a definite literary product, the book in question
violently attacking the Catholic Church in a Protestant
society. 6
1 American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 334, 121
N.E. 2d 585 (1954).
2 Parmelee v. United States, 113 F. 2d 729 (D.C. Cit. 1940).
3 See footnote 16 by the court in Parmelee, supra, for an interesting account
of such differing moral concepts. For example, Japanese women are not
shocked by the absence of clothing on workmen, but are greatly shocked
by the evening dress of European women.
4 Rittenhouse, Obscenity and Social Statics, 1 W. AND M. L. REV. 303
(1958).
5 Regina v. Hicklin, L. R. 3 QB 360 (1868).
6 Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARV. L. REV. 53
(1938).
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The Hicklin Rule was first adopted by the American
courts in 1879 in United States v. Bennett. 7 Concededily broad
in its inception, since under it a work is obscene if it offends
anyone, regardless of age or occupation, the court applied
it even more broadly. If any part of a book was obscene
within the meaning of Regina v. Hicklin, then the entire book
must be held obscene and suppressed. The Bennett appli-
cation became known as the "partly obscene test" and was
generally adhered to by the American courts, although at
times reluctantly,s until 1934.
In that year one of the most historic obscenity decisions
was handed down in United States v. One Book called .Ulysses."o
The Ulysses case disposed of the "partly obscene" doctrine
and established what has become known as the "wholly
obscene" test. The court dedared: "... the proper test of
whether a given book is obscene is its dominant effect. In
applying this test, relevancy of the objectionable parts to the
theme, the established reputation of the work in the estimation
of approved critics, if the book is modern, and the verdict of
the past, if it is ancient, are presuasive pieces of evidence; for
works of art are not likely to sustain a high position with no
better warrant for their existence than their obscene content." 1o
No longer was a book to be judged by the "impact of isolated
passages on the susceptible," but by the "impact of the
whole on the average member of the audience," 11 this latter
impact however to be judged and measured by a "few selected
and approved critics." 12
Another milestone in the evolution of the law of obscenity
was erected in 1957 by Roth v. United States.'3 Material is
7United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093 (No. 14,571) (S.D.N.Y.
1879).
s Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Kennedy, 209 Fed. 119 (SD.N.Y.
1913), found himself applying law which he thought to be distinctly
out of phase with the moral standards of the times.
9 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
10 Id. at 708.
11Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1960).
121Rittenhouse, supra, note 4.
13 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
1962]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:302
obscene, announced the court in Roth, if its dominant theme
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest, as measured by
the average person applying contemporary community stand-
ards. But this is inherently vague. "We are driven to the
conclusion that the verbal formula for obscenity approved by
the court in the Roth-Alberts decision is not a single formula
at all, but one that embraces all of the current definitions of
obscenity . . ." 14 The Roth "Prurient Interest" test is of
little help in actually defining "obscene." "We know only
that material tested for obscenity must be judged as a whole
instead of by its parts and by its appeal to or effect on average
persons instead of the weak and susceptible. But of what
it is that must be judged in this fashion we know little save
that it deals with sex in any of its many manifestations."'5
One thing is clear from the Roth opinion; obscenity is not
protected by the Constitution:
The dispositive question is whether obscenity is
utterance within the area of protected speech and press.
Although this is the first time the question has been
squarely presented to this court either under the First
Amendment or under the Fourteenth Amendment, ex-
pressions found in numerous opinions indicate that this
court has always assumed that obscenity is unprotected
by the freedoms of speech and press. 16
The opinion then cited ten superior court cases where it is
assumed that obscenity is not protected by the Constitution. 17
A problem present even under the Roth opinion is the
question of whether obscenity is a variable or a constant.
That is, "whether obscenity is an inherent characteristic of
obscene materials, so that material categorized as obscene is
always obscene at all times and places and in all circumstances,
or whether obscenity is a chameleonic quality of material
14 Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitu-
tional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 58 (1960).
15 Ibid.
16 Roth, supra, note 13.
17 Id. at 481.
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that changes with time, place and circumstance."' 1  Chief
Justice Warren in Roth advocated the variable obscenity
concept, at least in the application of the law.
The line dividing the salacious or pornographic from
literature is not straight or unwavering ... It is manifest
that the same object may have a differing impact, varying
according to the part of the community reached. . . the
conduct of the defendant is the central issue .. . [and]
the materials are thus placed in a context from which they
draw color and character. A wholly different result might
be reached in a different setting. 19
In applying an obscenity statute or ordinance, the distinc-
tion between "hard-core pornography" and "ideological or
critical obscenity" should be kept in mind. Material of the
first type has a self-evident nature and is so blatantly shocking
and revolting that it is always held to be obscene. An example
of critical obscenity came to light in the recent case of Kings-
ley Int'l. Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of New York. 20
This type of obscenity is that which advocates ideas offensive
to community moral standards. In the Kingsley case, the idea
presented was that adultery was "right and desirable for
certain people under certain circumstances." The opinion
of the Supreme Court made it plain that this was not ob-
scenity at all, but is in the area of constitutionally protected
free speech. "The First Amendment's basic guarantee is of
freedom to advocate ideas."2 1 In this area of ideological
obscenity, the court frequently resorts to the "clear and present
danger test," so familiar in other freedom of expression
cases, that there must be clear and imminent danger that the
idea advocated will produce a serious substantive evil which
the state has power to prevent.
Yet another factor which has influenced court decisions
interpreting obscenity statutes has been the doctrine of Prior
Restraint. As stated by Blackstone, "the liberty of the press
18 Lockhart and McClure, supra, note 14 at p. 68.
30 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957).
20 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
21 Id. at 688.
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is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this con-
sists in laying no previous restraints upon publication, and
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when pub-
lished." 22 Although obscenity may be controlled by the
state through the exercise of prior restraint,23 care must be
taken that the statute is not so broad in its language that
prior restraint is exercised against authors who would other-
wise produce valuable literature merely bordering on the
obscene. Also, an obscenity statute must have sufficient
certainty of language, for the Supreme Court has stated that
a crime "must be defined with appropriate definiteness"24
and where "a statute is so vague as to make criminal an inno-
cent act, a conviction under it cannot be sustained."2
Where a criminal prosecution takes place under an ob-
scenity statute, Smith v. California26 introduces still another
requirement. In that case, a Los Angeles, California obscenity
ordinance held a bookdealer criminally liable for mere posses-
sion of a work later found to be obscene, even if he had not
read the book, nor had any other knowledge as to its content.
The court held that scienter is a necessary requisite for a crime
of this nature, and lack of a scienter provision in the statute
would render it unconstitutional.
Despite the above decisions, and those intimating similar
principles, many states retained obscenity statutes framed in
terms of the discredited Hicklin "Pardy Obscene" test.
These statutes began to pass under Supreme Court scrutiny
in 1957.
Michigan had a statute dating from 1938 which pro-
hibited sale of any book containing any obscenity tending to
corrupt the morals of youth. 2 7 The Supreme Court overruled
224 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 151-152.
23 Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
24 Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306 (1941).
25 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
26 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
27 Michigan Compiled Laws, 1948, § 750.343: "Any person who shall . ..
print, publish, sell . . . any book, magazine . . . containing obscene,
immoral, lewd or lascivious language . . . manifestly tending to the
corruption of the morals of youth . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
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this statute in 1957 in Butler v. Michigan.2S Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said of the Michigan statute: "We have before
us legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil with which
it is said to deal. The incidence of this enactment is to reduce
the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit
for children. It thereby arbitrarily curtails one of those liberties
of the individual, now enshrined in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, that history has attested as
the indispensable condition for the maintenance of a free
society."29 Michigan and other states with similar statutes
responded by enacting new legislation which merely pro-
hibited the sale of such books to minors.3 0
At this date, there is a good deal of divergence in the
treatment of obscenity by the various states. Some, like Vir-
ginia, have attempted to keep their statutes in step with the
latest court pronouncements, by codifying what is substanti-
ally the language of the Supreme Court in defining obscenity,
and applying the "approved" Roth "Prurient Interest" test of
what may constitutionally be censored. Michigan, Florida
and Maine, while removing the infirmity of unreasonable
breadth and restraint found specifically in Butler, still cling
to definitions of obscenity rooted in the old partly obscene
and wholly obscene theories. 31
Some states, such as New York, have retained statutes of
exceedingly broad language forbidding the production, sale
or use by anyone of anything "obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, indecent, sadistic, masochistic or disgusting."32
New York then attempts to meet constitutional problems and
infirmities in the application of the law on a case-to-case
basis, in effect engrafting, through these decisions, the latest
definitions and tests on the statute. For example, a 1960
New York case held that "the proper test of obscenity today
is whether to the average person, applying contemporary
28352 U.S. 380 (1957).
29 bid.
30 Lockhart and McClure, supra, note 14.
81 Ibid.
82 N. Y. Penal Law § 1141 (1950).
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community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests. Any test
which is based on other considerations, such as the possible
effect on the young and susceptible, or on the other hand,
on sensualists and libertines, does not meet the constitutional
test of obscenity." 3
The New York method is not particularly successful,
since in attempting to engraft modern concepts onto an
ancient statute 34 even the state courts find themselves in
occasional serious disagreement. Thus we have the phe-
nomenon of one New York court holding in 1959 that: "Sub-
section 1 of § 1141 of the Penal law is contrary to the letter
and spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1 § 8
of the Constitution of New York,"35 and another court of
New York finding in 1960 that "this section does not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States nor does it operate as a restraint in violation of said
Amendment." 8
In March, 1960, the General Assembly of Virginia enacted
the latest of the Commonwealth's statutes relating to the
control of obscenity. 3 7 As has already been indicated, Vir-
ginia is attempting to keep its obscenity statutes in line with
Supreme Court pronouncements. The new statute defines
obscenity as that "which considered as a whole has as its
dominant theme or purpose an appeal to prurient interest,
that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or ex-
cretion and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits
of candor in description or representation of such matters." 38
This definition is derived from both the Roth case and the
Model Penal Code, but it should be noted that there are
differences between the two. For example, the Roth case
33 People ex rel. Callaghan v. Bunis, 23. Misc. 2d 156, 198 N. Y. Supp. 2d
568 (1960).
34 N. Y. Penal Law § 1141 has been in substantially the same form since
1884. See Alpert, supra, note 6 at p. 64.
35 People v. Douglas, 21. Misc. 2d 551, 202 N.Y. Supp. 2d 160 (1959).
3 6 People v. Cohen, 22 Misc. 2d 722, 205 N.Y. Supp. 2d 481 (1960).
37 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-227-236.3 (1950) (Replacement Volume 1960).
38 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-227 (1950) (Replacement Volume 1960).
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speaks of "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" and concludes that if "the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest," 3
the material is obscene. The Virginia and Model Codes,
however, make no reference to the "average person" and
"contemporary community standards." Instead, they find
two levels of prurient interests. By a strict interpretation of the
Virginia statute, an appeal to prurient interest would not be
obscene unless it also went "substantially beyond customary
limits of candor in description or representation of such
matters."40 The absence of "average person" and "com-
munity" standards is cured within the Virginia statute by
"customary limits of candor" and later reference to "degree
of public acceptance of the book or books of similar character,
within the county or city in which the proceeding is
brought,"41 but it is interesting to note that the Supreme
Court seems to be saying that obscene equals appeal to
prurient interest, even though measured by contemporary
community standards, while the Virginia Legislature is saying
that obscene equals prurient interest plus going substantially
beyond customary limits in the appeal to prurient interest.
It would thus appear that Virginia may be giving even more
protection to literature and the arts than the Supreme Court
gave in Roth.
Against the background of illusive value judgments
inherent in the concept of obscenity, Virginia's new statute
is perhaps the best that can be hoped for. It contains a court-
approved definition of "obscene," one that is neither too
broad in scope, nor too restrictive in evaluation of the ques-
tioned work or of its possible effect on a particular class. It
contains the proper element of scienter, as the words "every
person who knowingly" are used throughout.42 The Vir-
ginia statute is concise and explicit, thus satisfying the re-
quirements of definiteness. The concept of variable obscenity
is recognized in that the statute exempts public educational
3 9 Roth, supra, note 13 at 489.
40VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-227 (1950) (Replacement Volume 1960).
41 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-236.3 (8)b (1950) (Replacement Volume 1960).
42 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-1228, 230, 231, 232, 235 (1950) (Replacement
Volume 1960).
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institutions" and persons such as scholars, scientists and
physicians, for whom the work may have no prurient in-
terest, 44 from its requirements. As has been pointed out,
"one criticism that may be leveled . . . is that the exemption
is limited to institutions supported by public appropriations. 45
The intent of the legislature is evident in attempting to prevent
the creation of 'schools'4 for the study of obscenity." 4 7How-
ever, it is worth noting that even if this were not done, courts
are given the authority under the statute to except a restricted
category of persons from their judgment that a book is
obscene. 48 This would seem broad enough to cover the case
of private educational institutions.
The Virginia statute also requires the courts to consider
evidence, if offered, either by experts or non-experts, of the
artistic, literary, medical, scientific, cultural and educational
values of the work, considered as a whole; the intent and
reputation of the author of the book; and the circumstances
of sale, advertising, and promotion of the book in determining
the issue of obscenity. There would seem, then, to be enough
elasticity in the statute to suppress hard-core pornography
while at the same time permitting freedom of press and free
cultural expression. The Virginia statute is perhaps the best
thus far fashioned as an aid to discovering that "present
critical point between candor and shame at which the com-
munity may have arrived here and now."49 An obscenity
statute can do no more; now it is up to the good sense of
prosecutors and judges, proceeding on a case-to-case basis,
to prevent the statute from again becoming so restrictive as
to impair the constitutional guaranties of liberty.
43VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-236.2 (2,3,4) (1950) (Replacement Volume
1960).
44 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-236.3(8)f (1950) (Replacement Volume 1960).
45 Shepperd, The Law of Obscenity in Virginia, 17 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
322 (1960).
46 Id. at 327.
47 Shepperd, supra, note 45.
48VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-236.3(10) (1950) (Replacement Volume 1960).
49 Judge Learned Hand's personal definition of obscenity, so opposed to the
legal definition prevailing at the time, which he felt constrained to
follow. See, United States v. Kennerly, 209 Fed. 119, 120-121 (S.D.N.Y.
1913).
